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The Descent of Nations: Social Evolutionary Theory, Modernism and Ethnosymbolism
Abstract: This article explores the use of a revised conception of social evolutionary theory
towards an understanding of nationalism. First I review the debate between ethnosymbolism
and modernism, through the lens of the Warwick Debate between Gellner and Smith, arguing
that both are partly right. Secondly I outline what the revised conception of social evolution is
looking  first  at  its  traditional  conception  before  outlining  a  Darwinian  view  of  social
evolutionary theory. Finally, I examine how Darwinian social evolutionary theory can help
fruitfully  bring the ethnosymbolic and modernist  perspectives together.  This is done by a
sustained  engagement  primarily  with  the  theories  of  Anthony  Smith  and  Ernest  Gellner
pointing to how Darwinian social evolutionary theory can provide a link between the two
theories that makes them mutually supportive rather than opposed.
Introduction
One of the long running debates in nationalism studies is between theorists of a modernist
persuasion, who believe that the nation and nationalism is a recent invention (e.g. Gellner,
2006; Hobsbawm, 1992; Breuilly, 1993) and those of a perennialist persuasion, who believe
that, whilst the nation is mostly modern, there is some evidence of movements similar to
nations  and  nationalism  in  pre-modern  times  (Smith,  2001;  Hastings,  1997;  Hutchinson,
2005). Though these two perspectives are often pitched against one another, in this article I
will  argue  that  using  a  revised  conception  of  social  evolutionary  theory,  along  more
Darwinian lines, can help demonstrate a continuity between them that suggests that they may
be mutually supportive rather than opposed.
For the purposes of this  article  I am going to be mainly focusing on the work of
Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner, though the work of other theorists will be brought in.
They were both leading proponents of their respective views and were, in Gellner’s (1996:
366) words, often ‘pitted against each other’ in debates between perennialists and modernists.
For this reason, it provides a clear case of two seemingly opposed views that I will argue can
nevertheless be reconciled through the use of the social evolutionary theory. Whilst this is not
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the first attempt at bringing together ethnosymbolism and modernism, and it is worth noting
that Smith (2003: 359) himself saw the two approaches as being complimentary, it is the first
sustained  attempt  through  using  the  meta-theoretical  framework  of  Darwinian  social
evolution.
I  begin  by  reviewing  the  debate  between  the  modernist  and  ethnosymbolic
conceptions of the nation through the lens of the Warwick debate between Ernest Gellner
(1996)  and  Anthony  Smith  (1996a,  1996b).  Having  done  this,  and  established  my  own
position on whether nations are modern or pre-modern, I outline the revised conception of
social  evolutionary theory,  dubbed Darwinian social  evolution,  explaining its  divergences
from  the  other  understandings  of  what  social  evolution  is.  Finally,  I  use  the  revised
conception of social evolutionary theory to demonstrate how aspects of Smith’s and Gellner’s
theories can be reconciled in a way that strengthens both of their respective arguments, thus
also  demonstrating  the  use  of  Darwinian  social  evolutionary  theory  more  generally  for
understanding the development of nations and nationalism. My general view is that social
evolutionary  theory  can  help  fruitfully  explore  why  certain  nationalist  projects  come  to
fruition rather than others.
The Warwick Debate
The Warwick Debate between Gellner (1996) and Smith (1996a; 1996b) centred on
what Gellner (1996: 336) dubbed the ‘clear dividing line’, namely whether or not the past of
a nation, prior to its existence, was important. For Gellner nations were created around about
the eighteenth century as a necessary response to the emergence of industrial society. The
need for a shared universal education, in order to train people to work in the more mobile
economy, fostered a need for a shared language and a shared identity. The creation of this
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high  culture  subsequently  led  to  the  formation  of  nationalism  (Gellner,  2006)i.  Because
nations  are  novel  formations,  it  was  not  necessary  to  know about  their  past  in  order  to
understand  them:  ‘if  it  tells  half  the  story,  that  for  me  is  enough,  because  it  means  the
additional bits in the other half are redundant’ (Gellner, 1996: 367). 
This is somewhat true of modernists generally: there is the view that continuities from
earlier times are not important, or at least not a major factor, for understanding the modern
nation (Hutchinson, 2005: 11-12; Brueilly, 2005), though more recent studies have looked at
continuities with the past, in structural, ideological and ethnic terms, and the developmental
constraints that this places on modern nation development (e.g. Malešević, 2013, Wimmer,
2004; c.f. Özkirimli, 2017: 143-153). This paper can, therefore, be seen as a contribution to
this expanding debate. 
Smith  (1996a:  359)  agrees  with  Gellner  that  modernism only  tells  half  the  story,
however he believes that the other half, the pre-history of the nation, is also important. It is in
the other half that the ethnic ties, memories, myths and communities form that can be an
important influence on national development (ibid: 361-2).  Smith’s argument is that nations
arise out of conditions from the past, but these past influences are important in shaping the
type of nation that they become. This is what lies behind the concept of an ethnie, which for
Smith is an ethnic group that has a core of experience that is transmitted through history in
the form of myths, memories, values and symbols (Smith, 1988: 15). Nations are not natural,
but they are anchored in history and are part of a historical process (Smith, 1981: 85). Smith
argues that the  ethnie is a step along that pathway, and one that needs to be understood in
order to understand a nation’s formation.
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The essence of the debate boils down to whether or not the pre-history of a particular
nation  is  necessary  to  understand  it  and  its  formation,  and,  related  to  that,  are  nations
exclusively modern phenomenon or do they have antecedents in the past?
My own view is that the modernist and the ethnosymbolic perspectives are both right
to a degree. I believe, with the modernist perspective, that nations are exclusively modern
phenomenon.  Nations  are,  as  Walker  Connor  (1990:  97)  says,  a  mass  phenomenon.
Consequently they can only really be a modern phenomenon: the necessary communication
networks, state penetration and widespread education, for the dissemination of a large group
identity, just did not exist prior to that period of time (Breuilly, 2005: Anderson, 2006). 
Smith (2015: 404) objects to this definition arguing that it is ‘circular’: ‘the concepts
of nations and nationalism are defined in purely modern terms and are accorded exclusively
modern features which, by definition, could not have emerged before the onset of modernity’.
I  have some sympathy with this  argument,  as  well  as  with Susan Reynolds  (2007:  183)
argument that what constitutes a nation is subjective and a matter of belief, and consequently
the  definition  changes  through  time.  But  I  think  the  argument  that  modern  nations  are
exclusively modern is largely correct. The definition is tautological to an extent, but only in
the same sense that modern warfare is a tautological definition. The technology for modern
warfare,  with  aeroplanes,  tanks,  missiles  etc.  did  not  exist  before  the  modern  era,  so
consequently it could not exist. The same, I believe, is true of nations. Whilst it might be the
case  that  ‘pre-modern’  nations  had  some  aspects  of  what  we  would  now  recognize  as
nationalism, such as civic codes connected to religion, or mass festivals (Smith, 2001: 21-22;
Smith, 2015: 405), the difference lies in the fact that a modern nation has all of those aspects,
and has them disconnected from religion, not just some of them.
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This,  however,  does not  mean that  the past  is  unimportant,  and that  the religious
origins of some ideas or beliefs disqualifies them from having an influence on the modern
shaping  of  nations.  Modern  forms  of  social  and  political  organization,  even  if  they  are
radically new, inevitably build in some way out of the structures and ideas of the past. They
are  ‘articulated  and  developed  gradually  along  the  contours  of  pre-existing  ideas  and
practices’ (Malešević, 2017: 153). This is as true of nations as it is of any form of social
organization; they are located in history and so build on that prior history in their pattern of
emergence. Contrary to John Breuilly’s assertion that ‘It is not continuity but discontinuity…
that needs emphasis’ (2005: 34) I believe that continuity is just as important as discontinuity
is in order to perceive how and why a social  formation emerges.  It  is also important  for
understanding why certain nationalist projects succeed and others fail, why certain ethnies are
chosen and others are not.
Reconceptualising Social Evolutionary Theory
To begin with I want to make a clear distinction between social evolutionary theory
and sociobiology (Wilson, 1975), or evolutionary psychology (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby,
1992). The latter two formulations rely on using biology, and human nature, to understand
why humans behave the way they do, form social groups, and what constraints exist on our
behaviours  and  social  formations  (c.f.  van  den  Berghe,  1987  for  an  application  to
nationalism; and Gat, 2013, for a more recent version). Whilst human nature and biological
constraints may be relevant, social evolutionary theory is not directly concerned with human
nature and investigating what biological constraints  there may, or may not, be on human
actions but with how a set of societies and cultures change and adapt, by applying the ideas of
selection  and adaptation  taken  from Darwin’s  theory.  This  approach,  therefore,  does  not
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support  the  contested  view that  social  behaviour  can be  directly  or  adequately  explained
through our genetic inheritanceii. The version of social evolutionary theory that I will outline
and defend is applied at the level of institutions, social structures and cultural ideas, between
populations of entities at these levels rather than a single entity itself. In effect, it argues that
Darwinian conception of evolution by natural selection can be equally applied to the process
of social formation and institutional development, as they can be to biological processes.
Before I outline the revised conceptualization it is worth describing the traditional
image of how social evolution is understood as a theory so as to have a clearer image of what
the  revisions  are.  Social  evolution  is  usually  posited  as  a  theory  of  progress:  there  is  a
continual process of progressing towards something, be it truth or goodness, and a constant
moving away from backwards societies. To some extent this is held in the word evolution
itself.  Coming from the root  word  evolverer,  it  has  the meaning ‘to  roll’,  that  it  was  an
unrolling  or  an  unfolding of  something  already  written.  The  idea  linking  evolution  with
progress is thus contained within the word itself  (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 30; Gould,
1977: 35). This link between the term evolution and progress was the reason that Darwin,
opposed to the idea that evolution meant progress, only rarely used the term evolution in On
the Origin of Species (1859), and preferred the term ‘descent with modifications’ as a more
accurate capture of what his theory meant (Gould, 1977: 36). Despite Darwin’s caution, the
link often remained and consequently social evolutionary theories usually posited that it was
possible to graph the different types of societies along a progressive line and so say which
ones are better than the others, which have progressed more than others (Gellner, 1964: 9-
12). As a process this is usually conceived as operating in global, uniform terms, with all
societies following the same pattern through a cumulative series of stages (Mann, 1986 36). 
There  are  many  potential  objections  to  this  version  of  the  theory,  from  moral
objections about how it seems to grade societies in a rank of inferiority and superiority, to
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historical objections that it does not seem to fit the record. For this reason, in this paper I
want to outline a Darwinian version of evolutionary theory and so draw out the important
differences  between these older  conceptualizations  and the revised conceptualization,  and
stepping away from the unhelpful link to the idea of progress.
The first point of criticism is that the traditional conception is unilineal in character:
one social form must progress into another, in the correct sequence. The revised conception
understands that this process is multi-linear in character. That is, it is important to understand
that when one social formation changes into another one it is not because there is only one
choice available. Rather, there are other competing options available that agents can choose
among and using a multi-linear framework helps to better understand why one option was
chosen,  or  proved  to  be  successful,  over  others  (Spruyt,  1994a:  5).  That  is,  in  order  to
understand why a particular social formation was adaptive at a particular time it is important
that it be understood in the context of the environment, and the population of entities, that
surrounded it.
This  is  how the  revised  conception  of  social  evolution  operates.  Social  evolution
operates on the same three core principles of Darwinian evolution by natural selection: 1) the
principle of variation, that through genesis and recombination there is a generation of new
varieties;  2)  the  principle  of  inheritance,  that  information  can  be  passed  on,  replicated,
through successive generations; and 3) the principle of selection, that there is an interaction
between a set of entities and their environment such that some of them prove to be better
adapted than others and so are more likely to pass on their information structure (Hodgson &
Knudsen, 2006a: 4-5)iii. Consequently some entities will  do better  than others, though the
‘losing’  entity  need  not  necessarily  be  destroyed.  Competitive  selection,  where  entities
struggle against one another, is only one form that selection takes and not necessarily the
defining one (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010: 89-90).
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What does it mean to say that something is ‘selected’ or ‘adapted’? These are familiar
concepts in biology, however they probably need some expansion in the context of society
and culture. This is especially true as there is sometimes a too easy, and uncomfortable, link
between  ‘adapted’  and  ‘better’  in  a  the  progressive  sense  that  we  are  trying  to  avoid.
However, this is again where a reconceptualised version of social evolution departs from the
older characterization. Whereas the old conception of social evolution operated on ‘general’
terms (Mann, 1986: ch 2),  as something that was true of all  places,  the reconceptualised
version operates in local terms. This is crucial for understanding what adaptation means. 
Evolution  requires  variability,  it  requires  a  range  of  differences  to  select  among,
which  have  differences  in  fitness,  so  that  some  are  'better'  than  others  in  a  certain
environment, and that these characteristics are in some way heritable (Sober, 2000: 9). It is
important  to  stress  this:  no  one  thing  is  exclusively  responsible  for  either  variation  or
selection. The organisms, institutions or cultural ideas interact with the environment and it is
this that produces variation and change, not any one on their own. Sometimes one aspect can
be more important than another, but all are necessary. Variation, in biology, occurs as a result
of mutation of genes, random drift (changes occur despite offering no adaptive advantage)
and recombination (new combinations of genes on the same chromosome) (ibid: 18-20). This
process is random, in the sense that it is in principle possible for any variation to be produced,
however the selection of variants is not random (ibid: 38). This is crucial when it comes to
understanding  what  the  concept  of  adaptation  means. When  speaking  about  things,
organisms,  institutions,  cultural  ideas  being  'adapted',  it  is  always  in  reference  to  an
environment that they are adapted or adapting to. Natural selection, in this sense, is a local
phenomenon – entities are adapted to their immediate environments. A consequence of this is
that it means that there are no adaptations that are, so to speak, universally 'good'. It is always
context dependent. 
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It is important to stress that this does not have a moral implication to it: just because
one entity outcompetes another does not mean that is ‘better’ based on some optimal criteria,
or  more  moral  than  others.  Natural  selection,  and  social  selection,  is  not  a  perfecting
phenomenon. It selects the best available variants in an environment, not the best possible
that can be conceived (Sober, 2000: 39). Very often suboptimal adaptations can persist over
generations because evolution relies on, and builds on, structures from the past (Hodgson &
Knudsen, 2010: 220). Or, to use an analogy from Reeve and Sherman (1993: 95) ‘selection is
a  little  like a  game of poker:  The best hand (phenotype)  wins (reproduces) regardless of
whether it is a pair of twos or four aces’.
How does this apply in social evolutionary terms? By thinking in local terms, i.e. how
this specific social formation fits these specific conditions in a particular environment, social
evolution  can  escape  from the  problems of  stages  and  its  moral  implications.  Using the
concept  of  selection  it  looks  at  understanding  why  a  particular  cultural  idea,  or  variant
(Richerson  &  Boyd,  2006),  is  adaptive  at  a  particular  point  in  time.  Darwinian  social
evolution  operates  as  a  framework which  can  help  complete  explanations  of  change and
development of particular institutions and social formations (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006a: 2),
but  it  is  not  enough  on  its  own:  it  requires  auxiliary  hypotheses,  explanations  and
assumptions in order to explain specific events (ibid: 17). However, because it is not tied to a
story of world growth or general,  stage-by-stage explanation of development,  it  can be a
general framework that provides an explanation of particular processes (Hearn, 2014: 183).
‘It is a metatheoretical framework rather than a complete context-specific theory’ (Hodgson
& Knudsen, 2010: 46).
As  David  L.  Hull  (2001:  2)  notes,  the  concepts  of  biological  evolution,  genes,
organisms and species can be readily redefined as replicators, interactors and lineages. Doing
this not only makes these categories more general, and therefore applicable to understanding
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social  evolution,  but  it  also  makes  clearer  their  function  in  the  evolutionary  process.
Replicators are defined as ‘a entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive
replications’ (Hull, 1988: 408), with a interactor being ‘an entity that interacts as a cohesive
whole  with  its  environment  in  such  a  way  that  this  interaction  causes replication  to  be
differential’  (ibid:  408  [emphasis  in  original]),  and  a  lineage  is  ‘an  entity  that  persists
indefinitely through time either in the same or an altered state as a result of replication’ (ibid:
409). What matters is the function the entity happens to perform at a particular time in a
particular process (Hull, 2001: 21)
Boyd & Richerson (1992) provide an outline of how a general framework can explain
particular processes. Cultural and social evolution is capable of generating different variants,
and  consequently  different  unique  historical  trajectories,  despite  it  being  the  result  of  a
universal  process  (ibid:  287-8).  This  happens  through  two  means.  Social  and  cultural
evolution,  like  biological  evolution,  proceeds  on  the  basis  of  inheritance,  variation  and
selection. Different variations occur in response to different environments, with the 'better'
variants being selected as they fit that environment. Societies then inherit that variation from
their past. In the social world there is the added element that people can make choices about
what to inherit and what not to inherit  - so a rule or tradition can be evaluated by people and,
if it is no longer beneficial, can be dropped or swapped for another thanks to human agency
(ibid: 289-90). So far this might sound similar to the alternate form of social evolution, with
stages. However, the key difference is that the Darwinian understanding of social evolution
can recognize that at any particular time there can be multiple variants, or possible stages,
that  societies  can go through (Spruyt,  1994a).  This  is  because there is  not  just  one local
optimum that a society can reach, but rather many different local optima (as well as sub-
optimal maximums, or false optima).  The analogy that Boyd and Richerson (1992) draw on
is that of a topographical field: there are different hills and peaks, all different in some ways.
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A society can go up one, but not the others. Once it has started up a hill,  however, it  is
difficult,  if not impossible, for it to get to another hill. For this reason, despite being in a
nominally similar environment with similar populations you can still get different societies
with  different  historical  trajectories  (ibid:  294-8).  This  conception  of  social  evolutionary
theory is not without criticisms. A recent robust engagement with it comes from Michael
Mann (2016) building on earlier criticisms he laid out in the first volume of his  Sources of
Social Power (1986). In it he outlines three types of social evolutionary theory: a minimalist
theory, a multilinear theory and a general theory of evolution. He argues that the minimalist
theory, that people adapt and respond to external pressures, is true but trivial and places too
much emphasis on the exogenous without making space for endogenous potential of people,
and struggles to avoid the problem of tautology (Mann, 2016: 205). The multilinear view,
which argues that different groups have different trajectories, suffers in Mann’s view because
it sees groups as being too bounded and not as fuzzy around the edges as more likely correct.
This also inhibits it from creating a more general evolutionary theory (ibid: 206). 
However, a general theory of social evolution is problematic. In order for one to exist
there would have to be demonstration of how one part, or one system, flows into the next and
the theory would have to be capable of taking in the various different aspects and applying
the theory to everything. As Mann points out sociology “is not that simple” (ibid: 234). It is
worth pointing out that Mann still appears to be conceiving of the idea that social evolution
requires stages and needs to be progressing towards something (greater complexity is the
example picked out (ibid: 206-207)). However, this need not be the case.
He points to changes in military power to argue for the case that changes tend to come
in a cyclical pattern rather than an evolutionary one. Mann makes the case that empires, such
as Rome or China, would often have great military strength, and would be able to range large
numbers  of infantry to defeat  their  enemies.  However these city-based empires  often got
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defeated by more nomadic warrior groups who used mobile cavalry units to out-manoeuvre
the  larger  infantry  armies.  More  mobile  units  were  then,  in  turn,  defeated  when  large
infantries  became  viable  with  technological  advances  that  created  firearms  ‘There  are…
persistent cycles in superiority between offense and defence, elan or discipline, and mobility
or solidity, and there are also enduring military verities through the ages. American military
cadets are required to read Sun Tzu, a Chinese general of the fifth century BCE. This is not
evolution’ (ibid: 221).
This however is not necessarily the case. The evolutionary process does not say that
there is always forward momentum, or progress towards something: it merely says that what
is successful in a particular environment will be selected for. In the military examples, the
driver  is  the  technological  change.  This  alters  the  environment,  with  successful  military
powers being the ones that can adapt to the new surroundings. So the return of infantry with
the introduction of fire arms is not a case of a cyclical return to large standing armies, but
rather a selection for a particular kind of military tactic in light of the technological changes
that have altered the environment. Likewise, the continual use of the writings of Sun Tzu
does not speak to a lack of evolution, but rather to the adaptability of the writings themselves.
Applicable ideas and insights can still be gleaned from them, so military cadets can still use
them. The same could be said of almost any idea or set of writings that survive. But the
insights,  or  the  use  of  the  insights,  of  Sun Tzu  in  contemporary  warfare  could  well  be
different from their use or interpretation in 5 B.C.E. China. That is an interaction between the
individual and the ideas. But it is not in itself anti-evolutionary. As Hutchinson (2005) has
pointed out,  many ideas,  myths,  symbols etc.  are  revived,  or returned to,  as people seek
inspiration and sometimes these can help. If they can, they get selected. If not they die out
and some other idea, either old or new, is adopted.
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I would agree with Mann that a general theory of sociology is probably impossible,
but I see no reason why this means that a general social evolutionary theory is not possible.
As Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a: 15) argue, because Darwinism operates at a high level of
generality it needs to be supported, individual and more fine-grained cases, by additional
hypothesis,  theorizing  and  evidence.  Social  evolutionary  theory  works  as  a  background
theory that can be generalized to different cases, but is not sufficient on its own to explain
every  case  (ibid:  16).  As  they  say,  ‘The  Darwinian  framework  has  a  high  degree  of
generality,  and  it  always  requires  specific  auxiliary  explanations.  The  meta-theoretical
framework  of  Darwinism  provides  a  way  of  inspiring,  framing  and  organizing  these
explanations’ (ibid: 16). A more minimal theory is possible.
Given this, is Mann correct to say that a more minimal theory, whilst possible, is also
trivial  and potentially  tautological?  Again,  this  is  not necessarily  the case.  It  is,  perhaps,
easier to slip into doing too-easy analysis and connecting things together, falling into the trap
of ‘just-so’ stories, where everything appears to be an adaptation that is suited for whatever
purpose it later had (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). But neither is this definite.  Evolution by
natural  selection,  and Darwinian  social  evolutionary  theory,  is  not tautological.  As Elliot
Sober (2000: 72) points out the main hypothesis of Darwinism are historical in character,
meaning that they can be verified empirically. Whilst there is something of a tautology to the
idea that the fittest traits, or the most advantageous traits, are the ones that survive (and we
know this because they survived) (Rosenberg & McShea, 2008: 28), this is not the case when
examined more closely.  The point of a social  evolutionary analysis is to work out why a
particular variant was advantageous over another variant at a particular moment in time, not
just to announce that the ‘victor’ was more ‘advantageous’. The tools of social evolutionary
theory help to understand why one variant is more successful in a particular environment than
another.
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For the reconceptualised understanding of social evolution there are then no stages
and no unilineal pathways. Societies and cultures change over time as a result of changing
environmental  pressures,  leading  to  certain  cultural  notions,  ideas  or  institutions  being
‘selected’ for over others, on the basis of their particular adaptive efficiency to a particular
local environmental condition.
Smith and Gellner: Some Criticisms of Their Approaches
How  then  does  the  theory  of  social  evolution  link  with  ethnosymbolism  and
modnernism? And what can it contribute to the study of nationalism? 
As alluded to in the introduction, I believe that social evolutionary theory can help to
reconcile  aspects  of  Smith’s  and Gellner’s  theories.  In  order  to  demonstrate  this,  in  this
section I will evaluate some criticisms of the two theories and then, in the succeeding section,
I will use social evolutionary theory, and the respective theories of Smith and Gellner, to
resolve them. 
First are criticisms of ethnosymbolism, particularly Smith’s version, provided by John
Breuilly (2005) and Umut Özkirimli (2003; 2008). Özkirimli attacks ethnosymbolism on a
variety of grounds, but the two more interesting ones for this paper are those concerned with
history.  He argues  that  ethnosymbolism is  terminologically  slippery,  and moves  between
ethnies and nations, confusing the borders between the two, too easily (2003: 345). Related to
this, he makes the case that ethnosymbolists place too many restrictions on nationalists: that
nationalists are not as constrained by the pasts in what they select and how they build their
nations  as Smith makes out (ibid:  347-348).  It  is  the use of the symbols  and myths that
matters, not what they were or how many (ibid: 347). For this reason he believes that John
Hutchinson’s revisions to ethnosymbolism, which accept  that there are multiple  and rival
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traditions, symbols, myths etc. that can be drawn on effectively ‘define ethno-symbolism out
of existence’ (Özkirimli, 2008: 9). 
John Breuilly (2005) makes a similar argument in relation to the importance of history
and the problems of  the ethnosymbolic  framework.  He presents  a  thought  experiment  to
outline his thinking (2005: 17-18):
Imagine a knock-out competition involving 128 competitors. Each competitor has a 
name and a distinctive marking. The competitors are divided into sixty-four pairs 
which decrease to thirty-two pairs in the second round and so on, until a winner is 
declared after seven rounds. The nature of the competition varies from round to 
round. Sometimes it is a contest of chance such as the tossing of a coin. Sometimes skill or 
strength determines the result. We know in advance that there can only be one winner 
[…] Once the competition is finished and we look back over the successive rounds the
name that will stand out as it figures in every round will be that of the winner. So will 
the winner’s marking.
Breuilly’s point is quite simple: as the conditions of the tournament  change every
round the victory of any particular competitor, at the end of the tournament, is going to be
down entirely to luck. The only continuity would be the particular symbol and name of the
competitor. But the symbol and name are unimportant for deciding the victor in a particular
round: they just happen to be there and could have been any other name or symbol. ‘[U]nless
one can show the same causal mechanism at work in each and every generation, continuity
cannot be related to one dominant factor’ (Breuilly, 2005: 18).
In both of these conceptions the key theme of the argument is that the past is largely
unimportant for understanding the modern nation and nationalism. Whilst there are things to
be  gleaned  from the  past,  this  is  incidental  next  to  the  use  they  are  put.  The particular
symbols, myths and so on do not matter to the nationalist project.
With regard to Gellner’s theory, the main criticism has been to do with the theory’s
functionalism  (O’Leary,  1998:  51-2).  For  Gellner  industrial  society  and  nationalism  go
together and the one brings into being the other: in order for industrial society to work, with
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its needs of mass education, divisions of labour and the structural arrangements to support
this, a high culture needs to be dispersed such that the people come to believe themselves to
be part of one collective group and are thus more mobile and able to support the industrial
society (Gellner, 2006: 34-7). City-states, or small communities, would not be large enough,
or have enough resources, to be able to facilitate such a task and thus the scale of the project
is  a  national  one (O’Leary,  1998: 43).  ‘Ultimately,  for Gellner,  states  took the form and
pursued the ends industrial society required’ (Hearn, 2006: 74).
In a recent series of critiques Hudson Meadwell (2012; 2014) has taken this further.
Specifically he attacks the notion, important to Gellner’s theory, that nationalism is necessary
for industrial society, and his implicit political conception of nationalism. Meadwell (2012:
566)  argues  that  the  strength  of  the  connection  that  Gellner’s  theory  holds  between
nationalism and industrial society is not one of function, but rather of necessity. The claim,
however,  fails  as  Gellenr  does  not  demonstrate  either  empirically  or  conceptually  that
nationalism is in fact necessary for the development of industrial society (ibid: 571-5). The
argument for the link between them is therefore a case of ‘special pleading’ (ibid: 569). 
The political conception is then problematic as the definition that Gellner provides,
‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit
should be congruent’ (2006: 1), does not work: the political principle does not contain any
legitimation within it, and would require extra-legitimation from other theories (Meadwell,
2014: 19). As well as which, the theory implies that nationalism is only an experience of the
politically dominated, who experience resentment at alien rule (ibid: 23), but this is not a
specifically nationalist  problem, as it  is a case of a reaction against despotism (ibid: 24).
Gellner’s argument from his definition, according to Meadwell, is therefore too limited for
nationalist movements (ibid: 24), but also incoherent as it does not allow for the possibility of
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assimilation,  but  only  for  separation,  stemming  from  his  view  of  nationalism  being  an
experience of the dominated (ibid: 20).
Meadwell  (2014:  26-7)  makes  another  noteworthy point:  that  later  in  his  writings
Gellner conceded that there existed strong dynastic states along the Atlantic coast, prior to the
advent of nationalism, which could be seen as proto-nations, and play an important part in the
formation of industrial society. In this case the logic of the argument is not working as it
‘inverts the putative relationship between nations and industrial society’ (ibid: 27). This can
also be seen in the posthumously published  Nationalism  (Gellner,  1997), wherein Gellner
advances the idea of ‘time-zones’, whereby different matches of a pre-existing state or high-
culture affected the course of nationalisms development in particular regions of the world.
These criticisms of both Smith and Gellner touch on some strong points and expose
weaknesses  in  their  arguments.  But  it  is  also  at  this  nexus  where  Darwinian  social
evolutionary theory can step in and provide a route for joining the two arguments together.
Smith, Gellner and Social Evolution
So how can the version of Darwinian social evolution elaborated here help bring the
respective theories of Smith and Gellner together? As mentioned in the introduction, Smith
saw ethnosymbolism as being a help to modernism, in helping to provide answers to some
questions that other theories missed (Smith, 2003: 359). Smith was not opposed to the idea
that there could be pre-modern nations, which distinguishes him from the modernists (Smith,
2001; 2015) but the ethnosymbolic perspective contains no necessary need for there to be
pre-modern nations. This is a good entry point into how the two theories can be brought
together through social evolutionary theory.
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The link begins from a key element of Smith’s conceptualization of nation-formation
(1989: 342):  ‘historical nations are ongoing processes, sometimes slow in their formation, at
other times faster, often jagged and discontinuous, as some features emerge or are created,
while others lag’. Although Smith does not say it, what he is describing here is implicitly a
social evolutionary process. According with Smith’s description, evolutionary processes have
no end point, as variations are constantly being generated, both at micro and macro-levels
(Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006b: 484-7).). As said, there is an interaction between the variants
and the environment so that the better cultural rules, institutions and so on will be selected for
that  particular  environment  and,  crucially,  will  get  passed  on  and  inherited.  This  is  the
foundation for the ‘myths, symbols, memories and values that make up distinctive traditions’
that  Smith  (1989:  346)  refers  to  and  which  persist  through  time,  though  not  without
undergoing transformation over time.
This  link,  as  well,  is  contained  somewhat  in  the  approach of  Ernest  Gellner.  For
Gellner, at least in Nations and Nationalism, it was necessary that nations came into being in
order  for  industrial  society  to  work.  Because  industrial  society  needs  to  constantly  be
growing,  producing  more  and  consuming  more  in  order  to  maintain  legitimacy  through
improving living conditions, it has social mobility at its heart. There is a need for a new kind
of division of labour that cannot be supported by old divisions of caste, rank or class, one that
can  accommodate  the  greater  mobility  of  people  (Gellner,  2006:  24).  There  is  also  a
subsequent need for more generic training, which enables people to perform different tasks
within the society (ibid: 26). Nationalism is, in effect, the glue that holds industrial society
together (Gellner, 2006).
Meadwell (2012), as we saw, has attacked this angle in Gellner arguing that he fails to
prove that nationalism is necessary for industrial society. The arguments Gellner makes in
Nations and Nationalism does not support the notion and, as Meadwell (2014) also points
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out, this formulation is only adopted in Nations and Nationalism, having not featured in his
earlier discussions in Thought and Change. But is this really a fatal flaw for Gellner’s theory?
Perhaps not, as with a small change in focus and the use of the Darwinian social evolutionary
theory, the problem can be resolved.
The solution comes from seeing nation-states not as being  necessary for industrial
society but as the most adaptable for industrial society.
What is meant by this? In Gellner’s later writing, as discussed above, he moves away
from the  idea  that  nations  emerged  without  precedent.  As  he  notes,  ‘along  the  Western
Atlantic seaboard of Europe it just so happened that there was a series of strong dynastic
states…so that nationalism, requiring that polity and culture be co-extensive, had its political
shells and cultural fillings pre-fabricated’ (Gellner, 1998: 29). But why, in this case, did it
‘just  so happen’? This is  where the concepts of Darwinian social  evolution,  and Smith’s
work, come together.
Smith (2015) argued, following Hastings (1997; 1999), that the kernel of ideas that go
on  to  form  nations  can  be  found  in  the  Biblical  tradition.  Though  viewing  Hastings’
formulation as ‘rather sweeping’ (2015: 406), he does none the less see the origins of the
ideas of chosen peoples and the idea of the ethnic model of nations as originating from the
concepts  drawn  from  Christianity  (ibid:  405).  More  specifically  there  are  the  ideas  of
covenant, election, exile, closeness and sacred kinship as being important in the ‘shaping’ of
nations (ibid: 406-410). He uses ‘shaping’ rather than ‘making’ as he accepts that there were
other important  factors,  in economics,  politics and society,  at work that came together to
make nations (ibid: 410).
This  ties  in  well  with  Smith’s  argument  about  how nations  form out  of  ethnies.
Smith’s (1989) argument is that different types of ethnie will tend to produce different types
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of nation. He makes a distinction between lateral ethnies, defined by being ‘territorially wide’
but  ‘lacking  social  depth’,  and  vertical  ethnies which  have  ‘ragged  boundaries  and
aristocratic  culture’  but  have ‘communities  with much more compact  boundaries,  a more
socially  diffused culture and a greater  degree of popular  mobilization  and fervour’ (ibid:
347).  These  background conditions  are  important  in  the  nation’s  development,  as  lateral
ethnies are more likely to develop into civic nations and vertical  ethnies are more likely to
develop into ethnic nations (ibid: 340). This is, to an extent, a social evolutionary argument.
The  prior  historical  formations  place  constraints  on  what  is  selected  in  a  particular
environment.  Consequently the conditions  that  generate  a lateral  ethnie mean that  a civic
nation is more likely to be adaptive, as it relies more on incorporating different groups under
an expanding bureaucracy that could spread a core ethnic cultural identity (ibid: 352-3) whilst
the conditions that create a vertical  ethnie mean that an ethnic nation is more likely to be
adaptive, as the stronger cultural sense and weaker state created the conditions for a more
ethnically centred model of the nation (ibid: 353, 355).
What this shows is that there is a continuity between older forms and newer forms of
social  organization,  and that  the  influences  on these formations  can  come from different
places.  What  Smith  terms  ethnies could  just  as  easily  be  called  ‘proto-nations’  in  Eric
Hobsbawm’s terminology (1992). But it is not so simple to say that there is a straight line
between the older forms and the newer forms. For this reason Smith’s terminology of ethnie
will be favoured, as it does not imply that what was under formation was a nation-to-be.
Let’s return to the earlier point of this argument: namely the question of how it just so
happened that there were strong dynastic states on the Atlantic seaboard in Europe. I said that
the problem in Gellner’s theory that Meadwell (2014) identifies can be solved by changing
Gellner’s terminology from the necessity of nations to the adaptability of nations. Now I will
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elaborate on what this means and how Smith’s and Gellner’s views, that of the importance of
continuity vs discontinuity, can be brought together.
The concepts of importance from Darwinian social evolution are those of inheritance
and  selection.  What  selection  implies,  as  discussed  above,  is  selection  with  regard  to  a
particular environment. As Hendrik Spruyt (1994a; 1994b) has shown there was not a simple
and straightforward continuity to the sort of dynastic states that Gellner was talking about
from the  feudal  model.  As  a  result  of  an  increase  in  long-distance  trade,  the  economic
possibilities  this  generated,  and the  growth of  towns there  was  a  change  in  the  political
environment that made feudalism unviable (Spruyt, 1994b: 538-539). In consequence new
institutional  forms  arose  these  being  the  sovereign  territorial  state,  city-states  and  city-
leagues, all of which were capable of mobilizing the new resources better than feudalism was
(ibid: 539). They were, in other words, better adapted to that environment. The sovereign
state won out as it was better able to solve the problems associated with this new form: it had
a clearer line of authority, resting in the sovereign, clearing up any potential confusions about
whether a commitment or contract was legitimate; it had a better definition of its territorial
boundaries,  meaning the area of  where its  authority  ended was clearer;  and it  was more
capable of iterative behaviour than were the alternatives; and they were mutually supportive -
other territorial states were compatible with one another (ibid: 554-555).
This is an example of the selection process. The changing environment generates new
variants (Richerson & Boyd, 2006), in this case the differing modes of political institution.
Institutions are systems of rules that crucially allow information to be passed on from one
generation to another in the form of a lineage (Hodgson, 2009: 169-170). In this case it is
allowing the structure of a sovereign state to be passed on and, consequently, imitated by
other political actors. The environmental change has meant that the form is more adaptive
than the others, again not necessarily the best that can be conceived but simply the most
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efficient in the particular local environment of Europe at that time, and thus it is selected for.
There are particular habits, practices and roles within the institution that are being replicated
and so inherited  and passed on (Hodgson & Knudsen,  2010:  137-144;  Runciman,  1986;
Runciman,  2009:  143-45).  The  institution  of  the  sovereign  state  itself  is  an  interactor
(Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010: 172), engaging with the environment and proving to be more
efficient than its competitors making it more successful 
Now we turn to Gellner.  What he identifies  in  Nations and Nationalism (2006) is
another environmental shift, as a result of the industrial revolution and the rise of industrial
society. Kings and Queens are on the way out as locus’s of authority and sovereignty and the
changes to work patterns and division of labour is opening up the political environment to
more changes. Empires are still there, and still going (Kumar, 2010), but a gap is opening up
for new variants to come in. One such variant is the nation-state and nationalist ideology.
This is what Gellner is identifying,  not the necessity of nationalism to the new industrial
society, but its adaptability as against other forms, in particular as against empires. While
empires share a lot of structural similarity with nation-states they are not the same thing, as
the emphasis is different in terms of what the boundaries of identity include and what the
focus is (Kumar, 2010).
But why nation-states? As Smith (2015) has pointed out nations have an antecedent in
scriptural parts: the ideas of nations, as covenants of people who are chosen and decide their
own destiny, are present in the Jewish and Christian scriptures, both of which had enormous
influence  on  Europe.  These  provided  a  shaping  influence  that,  in  the  context  of  the
environmental change, lead to changes in institutional formation.
 John Hutchinson’s work (2004; 2005: ch 3) is useful at this point. He argues that
nations are not, as conventionally understood, culturally homogenous entities. Within them
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they have a lot of conflicts over exactly what the particular meaning of a myth, or symbol is.
Nations are, in his phrase, ‘zones of conflict’ (Hutchinson, 2005). Hutchinson (2004: 117)
argues that, at times of social crisis, there is an emergence of ‘moral innovators’ who provide
a new directions for the nation. This can occur through the process of ‘mythic overlaying’
which  is  ‘the creation  of  fresh myths  by the new nationalists  embodied  in  extraordinary
contemporary  collective  sacrifice  against  a  traditional  ‘enemy’  that  can  be  presented  as
renovation  of  a  national  continuum when the  old  myths  have  failed’  (ibid:  120).  In  this
process the old myths, which are replaced by the renovated ones, are not destroyed, but are
instead pushed into the background where they can remain available for revival, should the
new myths fail (Hutchinson, 2005: 71). 
This is, effectively, a description of the process by which variety at a cultural and
social level is generated in social evolutionary terms, but it applies to political and intuitional
formations that exist prior to the nation as well. The reason why myths are overlaid on top of
others, but not eliminated, occurs due to the selection process. Variants are generated through
the process of cultural conflict, but there is also a selection for them: the social and cultural
environment, as much as the geopolitical and political one, means that certain sets of myths,
structures and so on are going to be better adapted to particular circumstances at particular
times. Because people are intentional agents they are capable of making a choice on what to
inherit and what not to inherit, so they can evaluate a rule or tradition and if it is no longer
beneficial drop it, modify it or swap it for another one (Boyd & Richerson, 1992: 289-90).
This  is  done  with  reference  to  the  criteria  of  what  is  more  adaptable  to  a  particular
environment:  what  is  going  to  be  better  at  binding  a  people  together,  for  instance,  or
garnering more support.
That  is  why  the  concept  of  ethnies is  important  and  why  they  influence  nation
formation: because different peoples have different cultural forms, myths, ties and memories,
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these place constraints on the way a nation can form and what it can do. The environment is a
constraining factor and no one model works for everywhere for that reason. Smith (1981: 65)
argues that groups with more striking and well-known myths are more likely to survive, and
those  with  more  obscure  myths  are  less  likely  to  survive,  that  is  become  nations.  This
question  of  a  strong myth,  or  a  striking  one,  I  think  misses  something  about  the  myths
themselves. It is not necessarily some internal feature of strength within the myth itself that
enables  its  survival:  rather  it  is  perhaps the myths  adaptability to  new environments  and
scenarios  that  gives  them  their  strength.  This  goes  someway  to  addressing  what  is  an
acknowledged weakness for ethnosymbolism (Smith, 1992: 439-40); namely the question of
why it is that certain symbols are chosen rather than others (Özkirimli, 2008: 6). 
But  it  is  a  weakness  that  can  only  be  addressed  by  including  the  modernist
perspective: namely the environment that the myths, symbols, the replicators, are adapting
too - industrial societies with wider group loyalties. The concepts of inheritance and selection
provides a theoretical  framework for understanding this:  the myths and symbols replicate
themselves, but they can transform overtime, as a result of differing environmental pressures.
The selection process then operates to weed out certain myths and symbols, or alter parts of
their character to fit the changed circumstances (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006a; Richerson &
Boyd,  2006).  This  is  where  Hull’s  (1988;  2001)  concepts  of  replicators,  interactors  and
lineages comes in use. In this case the myths and symbols can be understood as replicators,
which are embodied in institutional organizations that function as interactors. The entities
replicate  themselves,  but  they  are  also  interacting  with  the  environment  as  this  places
selective pressures on which myths and symbols are adaptive in the particular environment,
but also causes them to change, that is the meanings and emphasis in the myths and symbols
alters in order to be more ‘successful’ in the particular environmental conditions, in this case
they are the most adaptable to the particular needs of modern societies.
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Nations are thus, per Gellner, new formations that occur with modernity as a result of
changing environment brought about by the industrial revolution. It is not however wholly
new or free from the constraints  of the past:  the prior  formations,  through the sovereign
territorial state, the culture, myths and symbols that were in its history, the  ethnie, place a
constraint on the ways it can develop. The nation and nationalism emerges as a result of a
selection process, acting on the particular myths and culture of Europe (the religious and
cultural heritage) (Smith, 2015), that adapt and are selected for the new environment created
by industrial society.
Nation formation is always an ongoing process: there is no finished product to the
nation, as changes and variations are always popping up. At times there can be, as happened
with  modernity,  a  punctuation  event  (Gould,  1980),  wherein  lots  of  changes  that  were
bubbling beneath the surface suddenly all come together to effect a very rapid change, in
historical terms. But there’s no definitive end point.
Conclusion
Whilst there are real and identifiable differences between modernist positions on nationalism
and  ethnosymbolic  and perennialist  positions,  I  believe  that  both  sides  are  getting  at  an
essential truth of the matter. Nations, whilst modern, do not arise out of nothing and it is
important  to  understand their  past  history,  and the  constraints  this  past  history places  on
present, in order to understand how and why they formed in the particular manner that they
did.
For this reason, my argument in this paper has been that a reconceptualised version of
social evolutionary theory, to bring it more along Darwinian lines, can provide a means to
understand this. By looking at the respective theories of Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner,
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as two opposing sides on the perrennialist and modernist dispute, I have demonstrated how
the theory can help to resolve some issues with understanding nationalism and its formation
and,  in particular,  understand why certain  symbols,  myths,  memories  and institutions  are
passed on and continue to be potent  elements  shaping nationalism,  but cannot  create  the
variant of nationalism and the nation-state until the change of environment brought about by
modernity. It also helps provide a means for understanding why particular ethnies transform
into particular nations, and why certain ethnies succeed and others do not.
Nation  formation  is  a  process  (Smith,  1981:  85),  as  such  it  is  never  definitively
finished, nor are nations ever set in stone. Something came before them and something will
come after them. I humbly submit that the theory of Darwinian social evolution can provide a
means for understanding this process of transformation and change.
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i This was Gellner’s ‘pristine’ account of nationalisms development, he had a ‘secondary’ theory of its 
development that of the parable of Megalomania and Ruritania (Hearn, 2006: 99-100), but that need not 
concern us here. Meadwell (2012) also provides a cogent critique of the question of ‘necessity’ for Gellner’s 
theory.
ii With thanks to the reviewer who suggested these lines.
iii This terminology is deliberately ‘universal’, in the sense that it is not linked to biological terms (i.e. genes, 
organisms), in order to highlight the fact that the concepts can be applied to more than just biology.
